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I. INTRODUCTION
In Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health,' the
Supreme Court decided that a State may prohibit the withdrawal of
life-sustaining treatment absent clear and convincing evidence of the
patient's wish for withdrawal of treatment.2 For the petitioners in this
case-Nancy Beth Cruzan and her parents-the Court's decision that
Missouri may prolong Nancy's comatose life indefinitely was egtreme.
As a matter of constitutional interpretation, however, Chief Justice
Rehnquist's opinion was notably moderate.3 Although it permitted Mis-
souri to require that there be clear and convincing evidence of the
choice to withdraw treatment, it nevertheless did so on the rather nar-
row ground that a state may "legitimately seek to safeguard the per-
sonal element of this choice through heightened evidentiary
requirements."4
The Court's opinion might have taken the broader tack of stating
that there was no right to refuse life-sustaining treatment under the
Fourteenth Amendment, but it did not. After reciting both the common
1. 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
2. Id. at 282-84.
3. See, e.g., John A. Robertson, Cruzan and the Constitutional Status of Nontreatment
Decisions for Incompetent Patients, 25 GA. L. REv. 1139, 1143-45, 1155-56 (1991) (concluding
that middle position taken by Supreme Court in Cruzan was correct).
4. 497 U.S. at 281. The Court's opinion in Cruzan has also been moderate in its effect,
leaving right-to-die issues roughly where they were. See Alan Meisel, A Retrospective on Cruzan,
20 LAW. MED. & HEALTH CARE 340, 346 (1992) (concluding that Cruzan did not essentially alter
the law in the right-to-die area).
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law and the constitutional law supporting a Fourteenth Amendment
right to refuse treatment, the Court stated, "for purposes of this case,
we assume that the United States Constitution would grant a compe-
tent person a constitutionally protected right to refuse lifesaving hydra-
tion and nutrition."5
The dissenting and concurring opinions in the case staked out
broader ground. Justice Stevens' dissent,6 and Justice Brennan's dissent
(in which Justices Blackmun and Marshall concurred), 7 argued for a
sufficiently powerful Fourteenth Amendment right that the state may
not skew that right with its choice of evidentiary rules." And Justice
O'Connor, although she joined the majority opinion, also added a con-
curring opinion in which she made clear that she too believed the right
to refuse life-sustaining treatment was encompassed by the Fourteenth
Amendment.'
Only Justice Scalia went so far as to deny that there is a Four-
teenth Amendment right to refuse life-sustaining treatment. 10 Scalia's
argument begins with what I shall call "the rights pedigree principle":
no substantive due process claim "can be maintained unless the claim-
ant demonstrates that the State has deprived him of a right historically
and traditionally protected against state interference."'" Previewing his
own argument, he writes: "That cannot possibly be established here."'2
The reason it cannot "possibly" be established, according to Scalia, is
that Nancy Cruzan's case cannot be distinguished from ordinary sui-
cide, and states have historically prohibited suicide.13
Scalia's lone concurrence in Cruzan indicates a broader method-
ological divide between Scalia and other conservatives on the Court,14 a
5. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 279.
6. Id. at 330.
7. Id. at 301.
8. For a powerful and extended argument in support of this position, and against the
Court's opinion, see RONALD DWORKIN. LIFE'S DOMINION 179-217 (1993).
9. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 287.
10. Id. at 293-94.
11. Id. at 294. See infra text accompanying notes 43-66 for a discussion of the rights pedi-
gree principle.
12. Id. at 294 (emphasis added).
13. Id. at 294-300.
14. In addition to writing a concurring opinion, Justice Scalia joined the majority opinion in
Cruzan. At first blush, it might therefore appear that distinctions between his view and that of
Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion cannot be drawn. However, the cluster of opinions by
Rehnquist, O'Connor, and Scalia-all of whom were in the majority-suggests that there was
indeed considerable variation among those who joined in the majority. Moreover, Rehnquist's
opinion clearly indicates an inclination to declare that there is a Fourteenth Amendment protected
19941
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divide that pertains to how history and tradition ought to be used in
constitutional adjudication.' 5 In substantive due process jurisprudence,
several members of the Court appear to believe that the status of "pro-
tected liberty interest" under the Fourteenth Amendment cannot be ex-
tended to a purported right, unless that purported right is an instance
of something historically and traditionally protected. In other words, a
right does not get onto the map for substantive due process protection
unless it is an instance of something that was historically protected.
Moreover, even if it does attain "protected liberty interest" status, that
does not end the inquiry. The right must then be considered against the
state's interests. Although "compelling interest" has been the stan-
dard,"6 the Rehnquist Court advocates a fairly deferential attitude to-
wards the state's identification of the legitimacy and weight of its inter-
ests. Moreover, a historical judgment as to the legitimacy and weight
of state interests deserves considerable deference from the Court, on
this view. Thus, in Cruzan itself, the state prevailed because of the
Court's deference to the state's judgment of the value of its interest in
preserving life.
While Scalia purports to use this framework, he actually uses a
qualitatively different framework, one that is significantly more rights-
restrictive. The key question for Scalia is not whether the right asserted
liberty interest in refusal of unwanted medical treatment, but he declines from exercising that
inclination, presumably because it is unnecessary to the disposition of the case.
Petitioners insist that under the general holdings of our cases, the forced administration of
life-sustaining medical treatment, and even of artificially delivered food and water essential
to life, would implicate a competent person's liberty interest. Although we think the logic
of the cases discussed above would embrace such a liberty interest, the dramatic conse-
quences involved in the refusal of such treatment would inform the inquiry as to whether
the deprivation of that interest is constitutionally permissible. But for the purposes of this
case, we assume that the United States Constitution would grant a competent person a
constitutionally protected right to refuse lifesaving hydration and nutrition.
497 U.S. at 279.
15. Since Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791
(1992), there has been significant commentary on divisions among the Court's conservative mem-
bers. The analysis in this article, however-without purporting to comment on the soundness of
other distinctions that may be drawn-divides Scalia not only from O'Connor, Kennedy, and Sou-
ter, but also from Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice White, and other conservative thinkers such as
Robert Bork. Cf. Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARv. L. REV.
22 (1992) (articulating division between moderate, standards-based jurisprudence of Court's
center, and conservative, rules-based jurisprudence of Court's right wing-including Scalia and
Rehnquist); Ernest Young, Rediscovering Conservatism: Burkean Political Theory and Constitu-
tional Interpretation, 72 N.C. L. REv. 619 (1994) (contrasting Souter with Scalia-Bork
originalism).
16. See infra note 120 and accompanying text.
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by the individual is an instance of some right that individuals have
historically and traditionally enjoyed. Rather, the question is whether
the power asserted by the state is an instance of a power to regulate
individual conduct, that states have historically and traditionally en-
joyed. If the state can characterize its current attempt to control indi-
vidual conduct as an extension of a power it has historically enjoyed,
then the state must win, under Scalia's framework, even if there is a
simultaneous infringement of liberty interests that have also been his-
torically and traditionally protected.
Of course, it is not meant to be evident at this stage that the two
frameworks sketched above really are different; it is the burden of this
article to establish that point, using Cruzan to contrast the two
frameworks. If the difference is real, however, then its implications ex-
tend well beyond Cruzan. Scalia's opinions on a range of constitutional
issues reveal a jurisprudence that is profoundly "statist." Its orientation
is not simply to preserve the past, and not merely to forestall extra-
majoritarian legal evolution. Rather, his jurisprudence permits the
Constitution's respect for state powers to evolve, but requires that indi-
vidual rights remain precisely where they are. Ultimately, this article
argues that this form of statism is not justified by the concerns of judi-
cial restraint underlying the Rehnquist Court's more prevalent consti-
tutional form of historicism; it is deeply at odds with precedent in sub-
stantive due process jurisprudence; and it is inconsistent with even a
modest conception of a living Constitution.
Preliminarily, it is worth noting that Scalia's use of the notion of
"historical and traditional" backing for rights has received considerable
attention from several scholars, including Professor Tribe and Professor
Dorf in their work, On Reading the Constitution.17 Tribe and Dorf's
analysis differs from that offered here, however. Pointing to footnote 6
17. See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE & MICHAEL C. DORF. ON READING THE CONSTITUTION
(1991); Steven R. Greenberger, Justice Scalia's Due Process Traditionalism Applied to Territo-
rial Jurisdiction: The Illusion of Adjudication Without Judgment, 33 BC L. REV 981 (1992);
David B. Anders, Note, Justices Harlan and Black Revisited: The Emerging Dispute Between
Justice O'Connor and Justice Scalia Over Unenumerated Fundamental Rights, 61 FORDHAM L
REV. 895 (1993); Gregory C. Cook, Note, Footnote 6: Justice Scalia's Attempt to Impose a Rule
of Law on Substantive Due Process, 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 853 (1991); Timothy L.
Raschke, Note, Justice Scalia's Due Process Methodology: Examining Specific Traditions, 65 S
CAL. L. REv. 2743 (1992); L. Benjamin Young, Jr., Note, Justice Scalia's History and Tradition:
The Chief Nightmare in Professor Tribe's Anxiety Closet, 78 VA. L. REV 581 (1992). See also
David A. Strauss, Tradition, Precedent, and Justice Scalia, 12 CARDOZO L REV. 1699 (1991)
(describing and criticizing Scalia's traditionalism).
1994]
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of Michael H. v. Gerald D.,18 they argue that the most significant fact
about Scalia's employment of history is his insistence that rights be
specified at a very high level of specificity, rather than a high level of
generality. Although Tribe and Dorf think that the very idea of seeking
a metric of specificity in historical description of rights is wrong-
headed, they also point out that, if such a project were possible, it
would be undesirable, because the requirement of a high level of speci-
ficity for the establishment of rights would preempt the possibility of
meaningful protection of as-yet unprotected rights. Numerous others
have pointed to "specificity" as the earmark of Scalia's substantive due
process jurisprudence.19
While Michael H. leaves no doubt that a focus on specificity has
played some role in Scalia's due process thinking, and while Tribe and
Dorf do offer an effective critique of the alleged specificity metric, it is
interesting to note that in Cruzan the notion of specificity cuts no ice.
Scalia cannot and does not contend that the power to prohibit the re-
fusal of life-sustaining treatment is an instance of the power to prohibit
suicide at the most specific level. Nor does he criticize the other jus-
tices for insufficient specificity in taking a patient's right to refuse arti-
ficial hydration and nutrition through a gastrostomy tube to be an in-
stance of the right to refuse medical treatment. Thus, both as to the
power and as to the right, levels of specificity do not appear to have
played a role in Cruzan. More strikingly, on an intuitive level, the right
to refuse medical treatment certainly appears to be, if anything, a more
specific description of the right sought than Scalia's power to prohibit
suicide.
Finally, if Scalia had sought to run an argument based purely on
"specificity," the argument would have been much simpler and rested
on more uncontroversial premises than the one he chose. He could have
argued simply that the Cruzans failed to cite any well established tra-
dition or history of permitting patients to refuse artificial hydration and
nutrition through a gastrostomy tube to patients in a persistent vegeta-
tive state. And, indeed, the Cruzans did fail to cite any such history
and tradition, and could not have done so. Scalia apparently did not
think that such a specific historical or traditional "right" was a neces-
sary condition, for he failed to note its absence in this case.20
18. 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (plurality opinion). See infra text accompanying notes 93-96.
19. See supra note 17.
20. The authors of the Joint Opinion in Casey wrote "It is also tempting to suppose that the
Due Process Clause protects only those practices defined at the most specific level, that were
[Vol. 56:283
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Hence, specificity cannot be the key to the difference between
Scalia and his colleagues in Cruzan, and, as I shall argue, it is not. The
following analysis of Cruzan reveals that, even if specificity does play a
significant role in the distinctiveness of Scalia's view, there are other
distinctive aspects of that view: at the very least, an emphasis on the
identification of traditionally and historically protected state powers as
a means of ruling out the recognition of rights in our modern era.
Part II of this article provides the background of the Cruzan case.
Part III offers a critique of Scalia's concurrence in that case along the
lines described above,2 and suggests that the concentration on the his-
torical and traditional pedigree of state powers rather than individual
rights is a significant component of Justice Scalia's constitutional juris-
prudence. Part IV suggests that Scalia's use of historically backed state
powers is motivated by his desire to reach outcomes in constitutional
cases that conform to his a priori sense of which cases the judiciary
should handle. Finally, Part V concludes that Scalia's peculiar form of
state-powers traditionalism is inconsistent with even a limited notion of
a living Constitution.22
II. THE CRUZAN CASE
Nancy Beth Cruzan was severely injured and lost consciousness in
an automobile accident on January 11, 1983.23 She was thirty-two
years old. After remaining in a coma for three weeks, she entered a
condition referred to as PVS, persistent vegetative state, "generally, a
condition in which a person exhibits motor reflexes but evinces no indi-
cations of significant cognitive function.124 All medical experts involved
agreed that Cruzan had virtually no chance of rehabilitation. In the
Missouri state hospital where Cruzan lay, a gastrostomy tube was put
in her mouth. Nutrition and hydration were supplied through this tube,
and kept Nancy Cruzan alive.25
protected against government interference by other rules of law when the Fourteenth Amendment
was ratified." Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2805
(1992) (citing Scalia, J., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127-28 n.6 (1989)). Scalia
rejected this description of his framework in his Casey dissent, id. at 2874, and he is, I believe,
entitled to do so. None of his opinions-including Michael H.-advocates a view that so plainly
resists the articulation of rights previously unrecognized in a specific context.
21. See infra text accompanying notes 38-109.
22. See infra text accompanying notes 120-127.
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Over the next few years, Nancy Cruzan's family came to believe
that Nancy would not have wanted to continue this life-sustaining
treatment. The state hospital refused to discontinue treatment.26 In the
fall of 1987, the Cruzans filed an action on Nancy's behalf seeking a
declaration of her common law, state, and federal constitutional rights
to refuse unwanted medical treatment. 27 The state probate court found
that Nancy had a state and federal constitutional right to refuse treat-
ment. It based this decision, in part, on its finding that, during conver-
sations with friends several years earlier, Nancy Cruzan had stated on
three different occasions that she would not want to be kept alive as a
vegetable.2 8
The Missouri Supreme Court reversed the Probate Court in a 4-3
decision. It did not find a state constitutional right to privacy, and
found that Cruzan could no longer be said to have a common law right
to refuse life-sustaining treatment, since she was unable to make any
judgments. 30 Grudgingly, and for the purposes of argument, the court
assumed that there might be some federal constitutional right to pri-
vacy in this case, although it did not consider any other basis for con-
stitutional protection.31 It then held that the Missouri Living Will stat-
ute32 reflected a state policy favoring preservation of life,33 and
concluded that the state interest in preserving life "outweighs any
rights invoked on Nancy's behalf to terminate treatment in the face of
the uncertainty of Nancy's wishes and her own right to life." '34 It
claimed that the evidence of Nancy's thoughts on life in a vegetative
state was not sufficiently reliable to allow co-guardians to exercise sub-
stituted judgment.3 5 The Cruzans appealed, and the Supreme Court
granted certiorari. 36 Although the Court upheld the Missouri Supreme
Court's opinion, the Cruzans subsequently brought new evidence to a
Missouri lower court in December of 1990. They were finally allowed
26. Id. at 267-68.
27. Petitioner's Brief at 9, Cruzan (No. 88-1503).
28. Id. at 5.
29. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408 (Mo. 1988) (en banc).
30. Id. at 417.
31. Id. at 418.
32. Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 459.010-.055 (Vernon 1992).
33. 760 S.W.2d at 419-20.
34. Id. at 426.
35. Id.
36. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 492 U.S. 917 (1989).
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to have Nancy's treatment discontinued. She died on December 26,
1990.37
III. SCALIA'S CONCURRENCE
Scalia's opinion falls into five parts. The opinion begins with a
broad and passionate assertion that right-to-die issues ought to be left
to normal democratic processes.3" He then argues, based on the histori-
cal prohibition of suicide and assisted suicide, that a substantive due
process right to refuse life-sustaining treatment "cannot possibly be es-
tablished here." 39 Scalia turns then to petitioners' attempts to distin-
guish this case from suicide on the ground that "preventing [Nancy
Cruzan] from effectuating her presumed wish to die requires violation
of her bodily integrity."40 Next, Scalia presents a rebuttal of the dis-
senting opinions of Justice Brennan and Justice Stevens."' Finally, he
returns to his opening theme, emphasizing that the Court does not be-
long in this area.
42
A. The Argument From the Rights Pedigree Principle
1. The Rights Pedigree Principle: Definition and Scope
Scalia's explicit argument purports to rest upon what I have la-
belled "the rights pedigree principle" no substantive due process claim
"can be maintained unless the claimant demonstrates that the state has
deprived him of a right historically and traditionally protected against
state interference."43 This limitation is far from well-established. In-
deed, Scalia's support is weak: a two-justice plurality including himself
in a case of the previous Term: Michael H. v. Gerald D." and the
much-criticized Bowers v. Hardwick.45 Moore v. East Cleveland,46
which he cites, supports a logically distinct principle: historical protec-
tion of the right is a sufficient condition, not a necessary condition."
37. Tamar Lewin, Nancy Cruzan Dies, Outlived by a Debate Over the Right to Die, N Y
TImEs, Dec. 27, 1990, at Al, A15.
38. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 292-93 (1990).
39. Id. at 294.
40. Id. at 295.
41. Id. at 299-300.
42. Id. at 300-01.
43. Id. at 293-94 (citations omitted).
44. See supra note 18, at 122.
45. 478 U.S. 186, 192 (1986).
46. 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (plurality opinion).
47. See id. at 503; Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 304-05 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (concluding that
1994]
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The rights pedigree principle is thus weakly supported. It is also quite
contentious; arguably, a critical function of the Fourteenth Amendment
has been to relieve citizens of historical forms of oppression. Moreover,
as is famously articulated in Justice Cardozo's Palko opinion, the
Fourteenth Amendment protects rights which are "implicit in the con-
cept of ordered liberty,"48 a broader, and more aspirational idea than
the rights pedigree principle permits. 9
For the purposes of this article, I will accept the rights pedigree
principle. It is important, however, to say a few words about its
motivation.
2. The Rights Pedigree Principle: Motivation
With respect to the motivation for the rights pedigree principle, at
least four sorts of reasons might be offered.
a. Originalism
To the extent that a right was socially recognized or recognized in
common law at the framing of the Fourteenth Amendment, there is
arguably some evidence that it was intended by the framers to be cov-
ered by the broad principles placed in that Amendment. Con-
versely-and more to the point-if the asserted interest is not an in-
stance of any right that was recognized in the framers' time, it appears
somewhat less likely that it was intended by the framers.5
While this loose reasoning may justify historical practices as a
consideration in due process jurisprudence, it is a weak argument for
making a rights pedigree a threshold requirement in due process analy-
sis-even assuming originalism. To make it a threshhold requirement
would effectively presume that the framers could not have intended
broad principles whose content included rights not yet recognized in
practice. The propriety of such a presumption is far from obvious either
being a liberty "deeply rooted" in history is a sufficient condition for being a fundamental liberty).
48. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
49. See James E. Fleming, Constructing the Substantive Constitution, 72 TEx. L. REv. 211,
268-73 (1993) (concluding that the emphasis on historical practices in Bowers and Moore is more
restrictive than principled conception of substantive due process as aspirational principles in
Palko).
50. Scalia's commitment to originalism in Constitutional interpretation is articulated in
Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849 (1989).
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empirically or a priori. Nevertheless originalism is undoubtedly a par-
tial motivation for the rights pedigree principle.51
b. Incrementalism and Continuity
Justice Harlan's dissent in Poe v. Ullman sheds light on a second
motivation for the rights pedigree principle; the idea that the articula-
tion of hitherto unrecognized constitutional rights should proceed not in
leaps and bounds, but incrementally, in a manner that preserves con-
tinuity with tradition.52 A corollary of this idea is that when a new area
of constitutional rights is recognized, that area ought to be an incre-
mental outgrowth of rights already enjoying a deep historical basis of
support in nonconstitutional law and social practice. This incremental-
ist norm is supported, in turn, by a concern with retaining stability by
making small steps, by preserving continuity and correctibility. 53 To
some extent, this value also embodies the idea-frequently attributed
to Edmund Burke-that "cautiousness" or "prudence" is a virtue in
political life and in the craft of judging. 54
c. History and Tradition as a Foundation for Discovery
In the third place, the rights pedigree principle is motivated by
judicial sentiment that judges are not fit to articulate nontextually de-
fined rights out of whole cloth-out of their abstract conceptions of
fundamental rights. The right ought to have some basis outside of
themselves and outside of the text, but nevertheless appropriate to the
act of providing legally binding content for the broad phrases of the
Constitution. Moreover, the judge ought to have a way of discovering
what to count as fundamental that is not merely moral abstraction. 5
An answer to these concerns is our history: if a fundamental right cate-
51. See infra note 103.
52. See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 551 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
53. See Young, supra note 15, at 654-55 (explaining Burkean emphasis on slow, incremen-
tal change).
54. See Anthony T. Kronman, Alexander Bickel's Philosophy of Prudence, 94 YALE L.J
1567, 1569 (1985) (concluding that "prudence" as a political and judicial virtue was key to
Bickel's constitutional and political philosophy); see generally ALEXANDER BICKEL. THE MORAL-
ITY OF CONSENT (1975). See also Robin West, The Ideal of Liberty: A Comment On Michael H.
v. Gerald D., 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1373, 1388-89 (1991) (Justice Brennan's references to history
reflect commitment to conservative adjudicative virtues).
55. See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI L REv 1175
(1989) (concluding that permitting judges to rest constitutional decisions on fundamental value
judgments detracts from the rule-like quality of laws).
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gorization is based on a historically and traditionally recognized right,
then a judge declaring that such a right is a constitutional right is still
reaching outside of herself, into a basis that is common to all. More-
over, when she deliberates over the right, she has a place to focus: our
history of practices. Additionally, the rights that have a pedigree of
time have been tried and tested, and have been identified and recog-
nized by many individuals over many generations. 56
d. Rights Reduction
Finally, the adoption of the rights pedigree principle has been mo-
tivated in part by the desire to diminish the scope of the fundamental
rights recognized. Rejecting out of hand whole segments of rights
(those which are not instances of pedigreed rights) is, to some extent,
simply a mechanism for reducing the occasions on which the judiciary
interrupts the legislative process. But this is not necessarily an arbi-
trary limitation. Rather, it rejects all unenumerated rights except those
that the Court deems itself unable to reject because the individual is
able to ground her right in historical tradition and practice, and avail
herself of even the rather narrow quasi-originalist, and Burkean basis
for her claim.
The discussion above is not meant to defend the rights pedigree
principle, nor is it meant as an exhaustive description of the particular
reasons that some judges have adhered to the principle. It is rather an
attempt to sketch, as charitably as possible, the reasons that the rights
pedigree might be deemed justifiable. We turn next to the question of
whether it is really the rights pedigree principle Scalia applies in
Cruzan.
3. Scalia's Purported Application of the Rights Pedigree Principle
Scalia argues that the right claimed by Nancy Cruzan has no ped-
igree. His argument is that Nancy Cruzan's asserted right is an in-
stance of the right to commit suicide, and that states have traditionally
enjoyed the power to prohibit suicide. Scalia's treatment of this topic is
rather one-sided. It should at least be pointed out that many states
historically decriminalized suicide, and that states currently do not
56. See Young, supra note 15, at 655 (explaining Burkean emphasis on the need for "mod-
els and patterns of approved utility" and tried and tested practices, rather than mere abstract
speculation).
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criminalize attempted suicide.57 Moreover, Scalia's argument from the
punishability of aiding suicide is hardly dispositive; this law arguably
functions, in part, not to prohibit the immoral act of suicide or to save
even unwanted life, but to preempt the homicide concealed as an aided
suicide. And finally, Scalia concedes that by the time of the ratification
of the Fourteenth Amendment, the states no longer penalized suicide. 8
Again, however, for the sake of the argument, I shall assume that
Scalia is correct on the historical claim that states traditionally have
had the power to prohibit suicide. I shall also assume, for the purposes
of argument, that refusing life-sustaining treatment is an instance of
committing suicide. And I shall assume the correctness of the rights
pedigree principle. Scalia asserts that these premises together entail the
conclusion that there is no substantive due process right to refuse life-
sustaining treatment. 9 That conclusion is based on a logical fallacy, as
will be demonstrated below.
By saying that states in fact prohibited suicide, Scalia is demon-
strating that states in fact enjoyed the power to prohibit suicide. From
this fact, Scalia infers that there is no historically and traditionally pro-
tected right to commit suicide.60 But even this does not bring Scalia's
argument far enough. The rights pedigree principle says that there is
no substantive due process protection for a right unless it is historically
and traditionally protected. That means that there must be some his-
torically and traditionally protected right of which this is an instance.
Scalia shows (at most) that there is some right that historically and
traditionally has not been protected, of which Cruzan's asserted right is
an instance. But it does not follow that there is no historically and tra-
ditionally protected right of which Cruzan's right is an instance.
Consider the following analogy. Suppose that there is a rule saying
that a person is ineligible to join the Healers' Club unless he is a mem-
ber of a profession traditionally and historically regarded as among the
healing professions. Suppose it is proved that Jones is a lawyer, and law
is not a profession traditionally and historically regarded as among the
healing professions-on the contrary, suppose it is traditionally and his-
torically regarded as not among the healing professions. Does this prove
57. Alan Meisel, The Right To Die 65 (1989).
58. Cruzan, 497 U.S. of 294.
59. See id. at 294-300.
60. Id. at 295 (stating that "there is no significant support for the claim that a right to
suicide is so rooted in our tradition that it may be deemed 'fundamental' or 'implicit in the con-
cept of ordered liberty.'") (quoting Thomas J. Marzen et al., Suicide: A Constitutional Right?,
24 DUQ. L. REv. 1, 100 (1985) (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).
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that Jones is ineligible to join the Healers' Club? Certainly not. It is
entirely possible that Jones is also a member of some other profession:
that he is a physician or a nurse, for example. If that were the case,
then Jones would be eligible for the Healers' Club notwithstanding the
fact that he is a lawyer, that law is not traditionally and historically
regarded as a healing profession, and that only members of healing
professions are eligible. The leap from his being a lawyer to his being
ineligible for the Healers' Club is simply a non-sequitur.
Likewise, the leap from the conclusion that the asserted right to
refuse life-sustaining treatment is an instance of the asserted right to
commit suicide to the conclusion that this right cannot have due pro-
cess protection 61-if made purely on the basis of the premises Scalia
offers-is a non-sequitur. There may well be some other category of
rights that is historically and traditionally protected of which the right
to refuse life-sustaining treatment is also an instance. Of course, this is
just what eight members of the Court apparently maintain. As Chief
Justice Rehnquist, Justice O'Connor, and Justice Brennan each detail
in some length, the right to refuse life-sustaining treatment is an in-
stance of the right against invasions of bodily integrity, and more par-
ticularly, of the right to refuse medical treatment. Both are historically
and traditionally protected,62 as well as being explicitly recognized in
61. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 294-300.
62. With respect to the historical pedigree for the right against invasions of bodily integrity,
see Union Pac. Ry. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891) ("No right is held more sacred, or is
more carefully guarded, by the common law, than the right of every individual to the possession
and control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and
unquestionable authority of law."). More generally, the wrongfulness of imposing unwanted medi-
cal treatment upon someone has been recognized explicitly for at least two centuries. Slater v.
Baker, 95 Eng. Rep. 860, 862 (1767) (concluding that the surgeon's performance of a surgical
procedure on his patient's callous without prior consent was improper and contrary to the "law of
surgeons"). See also Schloendorff v. New York Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93-94 (N.Y. 1914); Pratt v.
Davis, 79 N.E. 562, 565 (II. 1906); Mohr v. Williams, 104 N.W. 12, 14-15 (Minn. 1905);
O'Brien v. Cunard Steamship Co., 28 N.E. 266, 266 (Mass. 1891); Janney v. Housekeeper, 16 A.
382, 384 (Md. 1889); Caldwell v. Farrell, 28 Ill. 438, 444 (1862) (concluding, in case where eye
surgery should not have been performed, that under certain circumstances surgery without con-
sent would be a tort and surgery with wrongfully procured consent would also be a tort).
Numerous scholars have suggested that, while consent in some form played a role in medical
practice in the Nineteenth Century, the concept of "informed" consent, as we have come to appre-
ciate it, was largely absent prior to the 1950s. RUTH R. FADEN & Tom L. BEAUCHAMP. A HIs-
TORY AND THEORY OF INFORMED CONSENT 86 (1986); JAY KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF Doc-
TOR AND PATIENT (1984); Martin S. Pernick, The Patient's Role in Medical Decisionmaking A
Social History of Informed Consent in Medical Therapy, in MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS:
THE ETHICAL AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF INFORMED CONSENT IN THE PATIENT-PRACTITIONER
RELATIONSHIP (1982); see also Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 317 P.2d 170,
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several constitutional decisions, including Washington v. Harper, de-
cided the same Term as Cruzan.6 Hence, the rights pedigree principle
181 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1957) (introducing the term "informed consent" into the case law).
Moreover, patients were understood to be implicitly deferential to their physicians, and therefore
consent was often inferred from the act of going to the physician. Pernick, supra at 119. Accord-
ingly, there are few reported medical-legal decisions from the Nineteenth Century predicated on
lack of consent. Nevertheless, the medical literature of the mid-Nineteenth Century appears to
indicate that physicians and surgeons understood their patients to have a right to refuse medical
treatment. FADEN & BEACHAMP, supra at 78-81 (concluding that reports in medical journals from
1828-1837 reveal a respect for patient refusals and the seeking of consent in some cases).
Faden & Beauchamp, Katz, and Pernick raise significant questions about the conception of
the doctor-patient relationship in the Nineteenth Century; they suggest that the concept of auton-
omy played only a minor role in the justification of Nineteenth Century consent notions. They also
agree that there was little explicit recognition of the right to win a law suit predicated solely on
lack of consent. This is, therefore, not a particularly strong point in the Cruzans' position. How-
ever, in light of the fact that there is (1) significant legal precedent dating back to 1767 for a right
to refuse medical treatment, (2) ample evidence of social values respecting the right to refuse
treatment, (3) a centuries-old right against invasions of one's body without consent, (4) direct
support in Supreme Court precedent for the recognition of a right to refuse medical treatment, see
note 63, infra, and (5) considerable disagreement about the power to outlaw suicide in the Nine-
teenth Century, these ambiguities in Nineteenth Century consent law arguably do not constitute a
significant weakness in the Rehnquist-O'Connor-Brennan opinions, even given the rights pedigree
principles. Nevertheless, it is notable that Scalia fails to mention this historical debate about re-
fusal of treatment, and merely addresses the history of suicide prohibition. This failure to do so
underscores the central contention of this article-that Scalia's focus is on the pedigrees of state
powers, not on the pedigrees of individual rights.
63. 494 U.S. 210, 229, 108 L. Ed. 2d 178, 203, 110 S. Ct. 1028, 1041 (1990) ("The forcible
injection of medication into a nonconsenting person's body represents a substantial interference
with that person's liberty"). Harper involved a mentally ill prisoner deemed to be dangerous to
prison officials and fellow inmates. The Court reasoned that, while the liberty interest prong of
Harper's substantive due process claim was satisfied by the right against administration of medi-
cal treatment without consent, Harper's claim nevertheless failed because the state met the light
"rationality" burden required to justify prison regulations under Turner v. Saffly, 482 U.S. 78, 96
L. Ed. 2d 64, 107 S. Ct. 2254 (1987).
The Justices in Cruzan cited numerous other cases as a firm constitutional basis for the right
to refuse medical treatment. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote:
Still other cases support the recognition of a general liberty interest in refusing medical
treatment. Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 494, 63 L. Ed. 2d 552, 100 S. Ct. 1254 (1980)
(transfer to mental hospital coupled with mandatory behavior modification treatment im-
plicated liberty interests); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 600, 61 L. Ed. 2d 101, 99 S. Ct.
2493 (1979) ("[A] child, in common with adults, has a substantial liberty interest in not
being confined unnecessarily for medical treatment.").
Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 278-79.
In addition to citing Botsford, Harper, and Parham, Justice O'Connor pointed to numerous
landmark cases under the Due Process Clause of the Fourth Amendment, in which a medical
procedure invading someone's bodily integrity was resoundingly rejected as the violation of a
"cherished" constitutional right. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 287-88 (O'Connor, J.) (citing Winston v.
Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 759, 84 L. Ed. 2d 662, 105 S. Ct. 1611 (1985) (Fourth Amendment); Schmer-
ber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 772, 16 L. Ed. 2d 908, 86 S. Ct. 1826 (1966) (Fourth Amend-
ment); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172, 96 L. Ed. 183, 72 S. Ct. 205 (1952) (Due Process
1994]
UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW
is satisfied. Scalia's comments about suicide-at least in connection
with the rights pedigree principle-seem entirely beside the point.
This analysis illuminates recent controversial cases regarding the
constitutionality of assisted suicide statutes. Because these decisions do
not involve the right to refuse medical treatment or the right against
invasions of bodily integrity-which provided the historical pedigree in
Cruzan-one would expect that courts following the Supreme Court's
"conservative" framework, would reject the constitutional claims, and
reach what commentators would probably refer to as a "conservative"
result in favor of the state. Conversely, one would expect that any court
that did find a protected liberty interest, must have departed from the
rights pedigree principle, and drawn from less conservative frameworks
of due process analysis. Both of these results have been borne out.
The Supreme Court of Michigan and the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York have both applied the
rights pedigree principle, although not under this name.64 Despite
Cruzan's apparent recognition of a right to refuse unwanted medical
treatment, they have decided that there is no right to engage in physi-
cian-assisted suicide. The only right of which the right to physician-
assisted suicide was said to be an instance was a general autonomy
right to make personal choices about how and when one will die. This
purported right does not have a historical pedigree, according to these
courts. Therefore, there is no historically and traditionally protected
right of which the right to physician assisted suicide is an instance, and
the substantive due process claim must fail. 5
Clause)).
64. People v. Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d 714 (Mich. 1994), cert. denied, 63 U.S.L.W. 3770
(U.S. Apr. 24, 1995); Quill v. Koppel, No. 94 Civ. 5321, 63 U.S.L.W. 2406, 1994 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 17965 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 1994).
65. Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d at 714 ("It would be an impermissibly radical departure from
tradition, and from the principles that underlie that tradition, to declare that there is such a
fundamental right protected by the Due Process Clause."); Quill, 63 U.S.L.W. at 2407 ("[plain-
tiffs] have pointed to nothing in the historical record to indicate that even this [limited] form of
assisted suicide has been given any kind of sanction in our legal history that would help establish
it as a constitutional right. . . This court holds that the type of physician-assisted suicide at issue
in this case does not involve a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Due Process
Clause.").
In Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 850 F. Supp. 1454 (W.D. Wash. 1994), the United
States District Court for the Western District of Washington has found a protected liberty inter-
est in the physician-assisted suicide context, but it has clearly rejected the rights pedigree princi-
ple, and adopted a broad conception of autonomy of the sort articulated by Justice Stevens in his
Cruzan dissent. While it may depart methodologically from the conservative framework, the Com-
passion in Dying approach is methodologically consistent with (although not necessarily required
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To return to the "Healers' Club" analogy,68 if Ms. Brown is only a
lawyer, and not also a physician or nurse, her eligibility for the Heal-
ers' Club does. turn on whether she can make the argument that law is
historically and traditionally one of the healing professions, and the
plausible determination that law has not traditionally and historically
been regarded as among the healing professions does in fact render
Brown ineligible for the Healers' Club. Returning to the assisted sui-
cide context, because the claimants only asserted basis for a right was a
broad autonomy interest to make choices regarding one's death-an
autonomy-based right to suicide-their argument (assuming, arguendo,
the soundness of the rights pedigree principle) turned on the historical
pedigree of a right to suicide, and therefore failed. However, in Cruzan,
the eligibility of the right to refuse life sustaining medical treatment
for protected liberty status did not turn solely on whether there was a
pedigreed right to suicide. It depended on whether there was a pedi-
greed right to refuse medical treatment, and thus, protected liberty in-
terest status was properly established.
B. The Argument From the Power Pedigree Principle
1. Reconstructing Scalia's Argument
While the explicit text of Scalia's opinion does contain the fallacy
revealed above, a more fruitful approach to understanding his view
would begin by assuming that Justice Scalia is not really endorsing a
non-sequitur or attempting to persuade with sophistical arguments. As
described below, this leads to the conclusion that it is not really the
rights pedigree principle that Scalia has in mind.
The basis on which Scalia rejects the asserted right to refuse life-
sustaining treatment is that it is an instance of a form of con-
duct-suicide-which is not a historically and traditionally protected
right.617 More fundamentally, Scalia points out that states typically
have prohibited suicide, as a historical and traditional matter. The
linchpin of his argument appears to be that Cruzan's asserted right
pertains to a form of conduct that states have traditionally and histori-
cally enjoyed the power to prohibit. 8 That fact-coupled with his char-
by) the "ordered liberty" conception of substantive due process. Consistent with the conservative
framework described above, the Ninth Circuit recently reversed the District Court in Compassion
in Dying v. Washington, 49 F.3d 586 (9th Cir. 1995).
66. See supra text accompanying notes 60-61.
67. Id. at 294-95.
68. Id. at 298-99.
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acterization of this case as an instance of suicide-is sufficient under
Scalia's framework (whatever that may be) to entail that there is no
due process protection for Cruzan's asserted right.
The structure of this argument suggests that the pivotal question
for Scalia is not whether the individual right is an instance of a right
historically and traditionally protected, but whether the state's asserted
power is an instance of some state power that is historically and tradi-
tionally protected. In particular, Scalia appears to endorse the premise:
Substantive due process protection for a given form of individual con-
duct cannot possibly exist if the power to prohibit that form of con-
duct is an instance of a power that states have traditionally and his-
torically enjoyed. I shall refer to this premise as "the power pedigree
principle. '6 9
With the power pedigree principle, Scalia's argument is clear.
Since the power to prohibit suicide has a pedigree, it follows that, if the
power to prohibit the refusal to continue life-sustaining treatment is an
instance of the power to prohibit suicide, then the state's exercise of the
power to prohibit the refusal of life-sustaining treatment cannot be a
violation of substantive due process.
The distinction between the two principles can be seen by taking a
69. Students of Hohfeld may be initially perplexed by this formulation. See Wesley New-
comb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23
YALE LJ. 16, 28 (1913). First, the opposite of X's "right" against Y's doing A to X, under
Hohfeld's scheme, was Y's "privilege" to do A to X, and the term "power" referred to something
quite different. In light of the fact that Y, in constitutional decisions, is principally the state, the
term "power" strikes me as more appropriate as the label for Y's enjoyment of the ability to do A
to X; Hohfeld was dealing principally with "jural" relations between private parties, where "privi-
lege" is surely a more conventional term for what I have called "power."
Second, several commentators on this article have suggested that if the rights pedigree princi-
ple and the power pedigree principle are to have different consequences, then the notion of
"power" cannot merely be the opposite of "right." That intuition is not strictly correct, I believe.
The power pedigree principle can be reformulated in terms of rights: There will be no substantive
due process protection for an asserted right if there is some right against the state, of which the
asserted right is an instance, that was historically and traditionally denied protection. Thus, the
critical difference between the two principles can be understood as follows: the conservative
(O'Connor) believes that it is a necessary condition for current protection that there existed some
category of rights that was historically and traditionally protected, of which this is an instance.
Scalia believes that it is a necessary condition that there not have existed any category of rights
that were historically and traditionally denied protection, of which the asserted right is an in-
stance. I believe Scalia's position is more easily phrased in terms of powers, but the concept of
powers is not intended to contain any extra feature.
Finally, note that a further difference between the rights pedigree principle and the power
pedigree principle is that rights at common law between private individuals are capable of form-
ing a basis for rights protection against the state, under a rights pedigree approach, but not under
an approach that merely focuses on state powers.
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somewhat different look at the case of suicide. Consider the following
hypothetical example. Suppose that a terrorist group does not like the
fact that certain people get down on their knees by their bedside to
pray every night, and members of this group begin to conceal them-
selves in people's homes and shoot them when they pray. Suppose fur-
ther that public and credible threats to continue this practice are made.
Given these circumstances, it might well be suicide for a person who
knew of these facts to kneel down and pray to God in the privacy of her
home, but it would not follow that there was no right to kneel down
and pray to God in one's home. The right to do this would not be predi-
cated on the right to suicide, but on the right to free exercise.
The example is meant only to highlight the difference between the
power pedigree principle and the rights pedigree principle. The fact
that a kind of action can be classified as "suicide" and that there is no
right to suicide does not mean that there is no right to perform that
kind of action; it merely means that if there is a right to perform that
kind of action, it must be grounded elsewhere .7  Thus, the fact that
suicide was historically within the state's power to prohibit does not
mean that the refusal of life-sustaining treatment must be within the
state's power to prohibit, even if the refusal of life-sustaining treat-
ment is suicide.7 1
Scalia's conflation of the rights pedigree principle and the power
pedigree principle can also be seen by comparing the text of his opinion
70. Of course, Scalia could object that the presence of a First Amendment basis changes
the example. But a hypothetical will work equally well by replacing the act of praying with an
established Fourteenth Amendment unenumerated right, such as the right to live with one's fam-
ily. The point is that rights that are concededly pedigreed would not cease to be pedigreed merely
by virtue of a situation in which a pedigreed state power was also implicated: the need to evaluate
the state's interest in exercising that power would simply enter the analysis. Similarly, where the
question is whether a form of conduct is an instance of a pedigreed right, the fact that it impli-
cates a pedigreed state power is not dispositive.
71. Scalia's actual argument is weaker than this. He does not argue that there is a case of
suicide here, but only that because the judiciary is not competent to argue that Nancy Cruzan's
act is not a case of suicide, there is no right to perform this kind of act. For the moment, let us
grant the premise that the judiciary is not competent to argue that Cruzan's act is not a case of
suicide. This does not mean that the judiciary cannot produce an argument to distinguish the two,
but that it cannot produce an argument that is grounded solely in the Constitution or in pure legal
analysis. In essence, it means that while the state's extension of historical suicide to Nancy
Cruzan's act may be ad hoc and ill-supported, any attempt by the judiciary to refute this argu-
ment will be unacceptable if it includes any form of reasoning in addition to logic, text, and
tradition. As demonstrated above, even in the argument where the state succeeds in defending the
stronger premise that Cruzan's act is a case of suicide, the argument fails. This argument is even
weaker.
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in Michael H. to footnote 6 of that opinion. In the text, Scalia refers
explicitly to what I have called the rights pedigree principle:
In an attempt to limit and guide interpretation of the [Due Process] Clause, we
have insisted not merely that the interest denominated as a "liberty" be "funda-
mental" (a concept that, in isolation, is hard to objectify), but also that it be an
interest traditionally protected by our society. 2
However, in footnote 6, where he argues that his view is superior to
Brennan's because he has a criterion for selecting the relevant category
of rights upon which to focus, Scalia refers in the same breath, appar-
ently without noticing, to traditions "protecting" and traditions "deny-
ing protection to" certain rights.
We refer to the most specific level at which a relevant tradition protecting, or
denying protection to, the asserted right can be identified.13
As we have seen, the question of whether a tradition exists protecting a
certain right-whether there is a rights pedigree-is entirely different
from the question of whether a, tradition exists of denying protection to
that right-a power pedigree. In Cruzan, as in Michael H., Scalia ad-
vertised the rights pedigree principle but decided on the basis of the
power pedigree principle. The quoted passage suggests that he simply
considers the two questions as one.
2. The Unjustifiability of the Power Pedigree Principle
The power pedigree principle does not follow from the motivations
underlying the rights pedigree principle.
a. Originalism
In a context like Cruzan, where the individual is able to offer a
clearcut pedigree for the right asserted, originalism lends no support to
the power pedigree principle. Of course, the state can argue that the
fact that states enjoyed a power traditionally shows that the framers of
the Due Process Clause did not intend to cover an instance of that
power. However, the argument is equally strong (or weak) that the in-
dividual's traditional enjoyment of a certain right shows that the fram-
ers did intend to cover an instance of that right. The presence of a
72. Id. at 122.
73. Id. at 127 n.6 (emphasis added).
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power pedigree is therefore incapable of sustaining an argument that,
under original intent theory, the asserted right could not have existed.
b. Incrementalism and Continuity
Similarly, the power pedigree principle is not justified by incre-
mentalist concerns. The incrementalist concerns are met once it is
demonstrated that a rights pedigree exists. For example, as Justice
O'Connor's concurrence in Cruzan demonstrates, the move from consis-
tent common law recognition of a right to refuse medical treatment to
a constitutional right to refuse the provision of hydration and nutrition,
is really only an incremental change in the right to provide it.7 4 The
existence of the right, moreover, provides for the possibility of con-
tinuity. The purported fact that the right to prohibit suicide is histori-
cally and traditionally protected is simply immaterial.
c. History and Tradition as a Foundation for Discovery
The recognition of a historical and traditional basis for the right
provides a judge with a broad, nationally significant, basis for the right
outside herself. Moreover, she has a tried and tested foundation for the
right. In asserting that this is a fundamental right, she is nevertheless
retaining a sort of philosophical humility, and refraining from drawing
purely upon her own sense of what is morally fundamental, in a way
that many conservative judges and scholars have deemed appropriate
for an Article III judge. Whether or not a power can be found of which
this is also an instance does not address the question of whether the
right is made of "whole cloth;" it addresses the question of what the
right might conflict with.
d. Rights Reduction
Unlike the other three justifications for the rights pedigree princi-
ple, the "rights reduction" goal does have an important connection to
the power pedigree principle, even in a case where the rights pedigree
principle itself is satisfied. If a justice's goal is to find principles that
will operate as devices to diminish the range of constitutional rights,
then the power pedigree principle gets high marks. It succeeds remark-
ably well in this goal because there is such a wide range of powers
states have enjoyed in the past. Cruzan is an example of the strength of
74. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 287-89.
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the principle: the rights pedigree principle does not succeed in ruling
out the right to refuse life-sustaining treatment, but the power pedigree
principle does.
The "rights reduction" justification comes perilously close to beg-
ging the question of which rights are protected by the Constitution; it
appears to begin with an extra-constitutional assumption that the out-
come ought to be "no rights protection." I shall comment on this point
at greater length in concluding. For the moment, it is sufficient to note
that the rights pedigree principle: (1) tempers the rights reduction
agenda with the recognition that, under the Court's long history of due
process jurisprudence, there must be at least a fragment of cases in
which substantive due process protection is granted, and (2) provides a
narrow (and arguably principled) ground for that small domain of
rights: they were historically and traditionally recognized. Scalia's
rights reduction agenda is incorporated in the power pedigree principle
with no principled attempt to preserve any of the Court's established
doctrine.
To summarize, provisionally: Scalia's affirmative argument from
the state's power to prohibit suicide is based on an equivocation be-
tween two principles, what I have called "the rights pedigree principle"
and "the power pedigree principle." The rights pedigree principle,
which is controversial but has enjoyed significant support from other
members of the Court, will not get Scalia his conclusion, for he has not
argued for the absence of a historical pedigree by arguing for the pres-
ence of a power pedigree. On the other hand, the power pedigree prin-
ciple would get Scalia his conclusion, yet it is unjustifiable by reference
to the concerns underlying the rights pedigree principle,7 5 and it is not
a position for which Scalia cites authority. 6 Thus, he attempts to run
his argument by presenting explicitly the rights pedigree principle, but
implicitly employing the power pedigree principle. The argument is
therefore unsound.
C. Amplifying and Rephrasing the Power Pedigree Principle
Scalia's apparent desire to give inertia to state powers is seen even
beyond the power pedigree principle. That principle is supplemented in
two important ways: first, Scalia argues essentially that an individual
75. See supra Part III.A.2 for a more detailed discussion of the rationale for the rights
pedigree principle.
76. For a powerful critique of other aspects of Scalia's traditionalism, see Strauss, supra
note 17.
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must bear the burden of showing that an asserted state power is not an
instance of a historically and traditionally protected power (at least
where such a power has been proferred by the state).7 Second, Scalia
argues that even if one gets beyond the first stage of due process analy-
sis and begins to weigh state interests against individual rights, the
state interest underlying its exercise of power must prevail so long as,
historically and traditionally, states have valued the interest in question
above the individual right asserted. 8 Like the power pedigree principle,
Scalia's attempted burden-shifting and traditionalist balancing stan-
dard are not evident on the face of the opinion. Those positions are
uncovered and criticized below.
1. Shifting the Burden of Proof
In the middle section of his concurring opinion, Scalia argues that
one cannot assert that there is a right to bodily integrity in this case
without first proving that it is not suicide, because if it were suicide
there would not be a right to bodily integrity.79 Arguably, the petition-
ers have a way to distinguish suicide, which Scalia ignores. While
Scalia does respond to some possible distinctions from suicide, he fails
to consider the argument that refusal to continue life-sustaining treat-
ment is not suicide because its intent is not to end life.80 But even if
there were not yet a distinction on this ground, and even if Scalia's
power pedigree principle were correct, his objection would not be well
taken as a matter of pure logic. It does not follow from the purported
fact that, if refusal of life-sustaining treatment were suicide, there
would be no right to bodily integrity, that one must argue first that it is
not suicide. It does not follow from the fact that one's premises have
certain implications that one must establish the truth of those implica-
tions independently. If it did, it would never be possible to offer a valid
deductive argument; one only learns from deductive arguments because
they have implications one does not already know. Hence, it may well
be that the right to bodily integrity is clearly and powerfully evident in
this case, and that the power to prohibit suicide is so clear that we are
forced to conclude from these alone that it is not suicide. Scalia would
77. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 294-97.
78. See id. at 298-99.
79. Id. at 298.
80. See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, The Right to Death, THE NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS,
Jan. 31, 1991, at 14, 17 (arguing that a person would not be committing suicide if she refused to
have her leg amputated, even if she knew that would lead to her death).
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say that it begs the question, but as a matter of logic, this is not true. It
can only be said to beg the question if one assumes that a justification
for a claim of a right to bodily integrity could not properly be done
without first putting aside the question of suicide.
This is one of the argument forms Scalia relies upon in his abor-
tion opinions: he argues that, since the conclusion that there is a right
to have an abortion could not be true unless the fetus were not a per-
son, one cannot reach this conclusion without begging the question as
to whether the fetus is a person (i.e., without assuming that the fetus is
not a person),. l For the reasons already stated, the last step of this
argument is incorrect as a matter of logic, and would be incorrect even
if the central premise were true.
But Scalia's argument is deficient at a more basic level. His spe-
cific reason for denying constitutional protection to bodily integrity in
this case is that the state would be entitled to invade it if it were to
prevent a felony, and that prevention of suicide is equivalent to invasion
of bodily integrity for prevention of a felony."2 But Scalia's argument
distorts the nature of due process analysis. The idea that the prevention
of a felony is a reason which the state can cite to justify its invasion of
bodily integrity is surely a case of the state citing a compelling interest
to justify the deprivation of a protected liberty interest. Hence, the fact
that prevention of a felony would be sufficient reason to justify the
state's action does not undercut the presence of a right to bodily integ-
rity, it merely justifies its invasion in this case. If prevention of suicide
does justify the state's action in this case, it is not because the power to
prevent suicide negates the existence of a protected liberty interest, but
because it is sufficiently compelling to give the state power to override
the concededly protected interest.
This is not merely a point of semantics. By pretending that the
Cruzans cannot identify a protected liberty interest without making the
suicide distinction, Scalia is able (or so it seems) to saddle the Cruzans
with the burden of showing that this is not suicide.83 Assuming, argu-
endo, that it is difficult to draw this distinction (without straying from
a narrow conception of "legal analysis") it seems the judiciary must
exceed its competence to find a Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest
here. The standard framework, however would require the individual to
demonstrate that there is a protected interest--quite apart from the
81. See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2875 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
82. 497 U.S. at 298.
83. See id. at 294-300.
[Vol. 56:283
PEDIGREES OF RIGHTS AND POWERS
question of the state's interest-and then give the state the opportunity
to show that it has sufficiently weighty interests that it enjoys the
power under the Constitution to act-even if the protected individual
interests are infringed. As the majority opinion itself noted:
[D]etermining that a person has a "liberty interest" under the Due Process
Clause does not end the inquiry; "whether respondent's constitutional rights have
been violated must be determined by balancing his liberty interests against the
relevant state interests.""&
If this is correct, then, as all other Justices in the case appear to
have decided, there is a protected interest in Nancy Cruzan's case, and
the question is only whether the state can show that its interest is suffi-
ciently important to outweigh that interest. Given the structure of
Scalia's affirmative argument, this has several important implications.
First, it suggests that the suicide question does not need to be ad-
dressed by the petitioner in order for her to establish a protected liberty
interest in this case on the basis of a right to bodily integrity. Second, it
suggests that, insofar as the petitioner needs to distinguish her case
from suicide at all (and for the reasons stated above, I believe she does
not), she does not need to address the question until the respondent has
provided a credible argument that it is suicide. For surely it is not the
claimant's task to show the Court, ab initio, that there is no sufficiently
important state interest; it is the state's job to show that there is one.
This suggests, in turn, that the state must prove that it is suicide, if it
intends to cite as its interest the prevention of suicide. And, in light of
Scalia's own comments about the delicateness of any arguments in this
area, it is in fact an open question whether the state can produce an
argument assimilating this case to suicide. In short, Scalia's sophistical
charge that the petitioners begged the question is a pretense for him to
shift the burden of showing whether this is or is not suicide.8 5
2. Transformation at the Level of State Interests
A third aspect of Scalia's statist framework is found in his re-
84. Id. at 279 (quoting Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321 (1982)).
85. Cf. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 124 n.4 (1989) (Scalia, J.) (concluding that
prior to identification of an interest as a "liberty interest," the Court must consider the effects of
the act which is the subject of that interest). This view is effectively criticized by TRIBE & DoRF,
supra note 17, at 106-09, who point out that, under Scalia's view, every alleged liberty interest
that a state might seek to invade could be denied due process protection merely by recharacteriz-
ing it in terms of effects that the State has the power to regulate.
1994]
308 UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW
sponse to the dissents of Justices Brennan and Stevens.86 This response
implicitly accepts, for the purposes of argument, that there is a pro-
tected liberty interest. The power pedigree principle is effectively trans-
formed, however, into a principle that ensures that even if there is a
protected interest, the state's countervailing interest will always (or al-
most always) win out.
Scalia quotes Justice Brennan's conclusion that
the State has no legitimate general interest in someone's life, completely ab-
stracted from the interest of the person living that life, that could outweigh the
person's choice to avoid medical treatment.87
He then argues that, however moderate Brennan's balancing appears,
the proposition cannot logically be so limited. One who accepts it must also ac-
cept, I think, that the State has no such legitimate interest that could outweigh
"the person's choice to put an end to her life."'88
Scalia has already argued, however, that states constitutionally have
the power to prohibit suicide.8 9
This argument is best understood as a historically based challenge
to the dissent's weighing of interests. He is arguing that the fact that
suicide is prohibitable demonstrates that, as a constitutional matter,
"the state's interest in life, completely abstracted from the interest of
the person living that life," does outweigh the person's "intense interest
. . . in her choice whether to continue living or to die."90 But then he
argues that the interest in refusing medical treatment is no greater
than this other self-determination interest, and the state's interest is the
same.91 Hence, the state's interest must still outweigh the individual
interest, and the right to refuse medical treatment cannot be constitu-
tionally protected.9
The first problem of this argument is that it does not follow from
the fact that suicide prohibitions were understood to be constitutionally
acceptable that the protection of life itself abstracted from the person's
interests was viewed as being a legitimate state interest. Suicide laws
86. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 299-300.
87. Id. at 313 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoted by Scalia, J., 497 U.S. at 299).
88. Id. at 299 (emphasis added).
89. Id. at 298.
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do not need to be understood as having been for that interest; they may
well have been either: (i) to prevent what was regarded as the immoral
act of intentionally willing the end of one's life, or (more acceptably in
a morally pluralistic culture); (ii) a mere prophylactic mechanism for
the protection of the life of the sort of person who does have an interest
in her life, but who is depressed or mentally disturbed or for some other
reason fails to recognize her interest at the moment she seeks to end
her life.93
Now let us assume that none of these is correct, but that states
actually have the protection of life itself in mind, and that, moreover,
insofar as it was understood to be within constitutional limits that
states prohibit suicide, it was understood that it was because of the
legitimacy and weight of this interest. The second problem is that the
argument relies upon the tacit premise that if something was histori-
cally viewed as a legitimate state interest for constitutional purposes,
then it is a legitimate state interest. Note that this is not precedent, it
is mere historical understanding. Nor is it justified by the rights pedi-
gree principle. If it is justified, it is justified by a self-imposed principle
of judicial deference; we should not second guess state interests when
they are historical and traditional. It does not take much to see that
this principle would permit many historical forms of oppression.
Note, however, that even this high level of historicism on the legit-
imacy of state interests is not enough for Scalia. He wants what might
be called the balance-of-interests pedigree principle.94 This states that
if, as a historical matter, a particular state interest was understood to
be constitutionally legitimate and weighty enough to outweigh certain
individual interests, then for purposes of present constitutional analysis,
it must be viewed as outweighing those interests. In light of what
Scalia himself describes as "the constantly increasing power of science
to keep the human body alive for longer than any reasonable person
would want to inhabit it,"9 it would seem especially inappropriate to
insist on a particular balancing of interests solely because that balanc-
ing of interests was historical. The rationality, advisability and, com-
pulsoriness of deferring to a particular historical judgment is surely
93. Id. at 347 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (concluding that suicide laws are based on the pre-
supposition that a suicide victim's life has potential interest).
94. By ascribing this principle to Scalia, I do not mean to suggest the he favors balancing.
Clearly, he does not. See, e.g., Scalia, supra note 55. The principle would only be used, for Scalia,
assuming arguendo that balancing was to be conducted.
95. Id. at 292.
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sensitive to whether the judgment was really made about the same is-
sue. If, as Scalia himself says, conditions are now changing so that life
now continues past the point where a reasonable individual would want
to inhabit her body, whereas life did not last so long before, surely this
is material to the issue of what the proper balance between life itself
and an individual's wishes for that life are. In particular, if it has just
come to be the case that persons are kept alive beyond the point where
it is reasonable not to want to inhabit one's body, then the previous
judgment about what weight should be given to a person's decisions to
end her life must now be considered of questionable relevance. In the
past, what hung on one side of the balance was unreasonable decisions,
for the most part; in the present, in increasing number, what hangs on
that side of the balance may well be reasonable decisions.
D. Summary of the Critique
Justice Scalia's opinion is contentious even from within a conserva-
tive point of view. First, he runs together the idea that the claimant
needs a basis for her right in history with the idea that if the state has
any basis for its power in history, then the state wins. 6 The first idea,
referred to here as the rights pedigree principle, is a controversial con-
servative principle advocated recently. But the second idea, "the power
pedigree principle," is a different, state-power oriented or "statist"97
proposal which Scalia does not articulate explicitly and does not
defend. 8
A second major defect is Scalia's failure to see that the identifica-
tion of the liberty interest in this case does not require any distinction
from suicide. The question of whether it is suicide enters in the discus-
sion of whether the state can produce a sufficiently compelling interest
to outweigh the individual's interest.99 Again, Scalia tries to suggest
that the petitioner must answer this question before the demonstration
of any liberty interest, but we saw that this was also an unsound
position.
Third, Scalia fails to recognize the subtlety of translating a bal-
ancing of interests on the issue of suicide to the current context, where
96. Id. at 294-98.
97. Cf. Larry Kramer, Judicial Asceticism, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1789 (1991) (Scalia's
rigidity and extremism inconsistent with fundamental judicial role of dispensing justice).
98. Cf. Strauss, supra note 17, at 1710-15 (criticizing Scalia's traditionalism and its pur-
ported defenses).
99. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 294-98.
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the action in question is not the intentional taking of life, but rather
where life, for the first time, can now be sustained to the point where
"no reasonable person would want to inhabit it."
E. Suggestions of the Power Pedigree Principle Beyond Cruzan
Without purporting to provide a comprehensive account of Scalia's
constitutional jurisprudence, this analysis sheds light on Scalia statism
in several other opinions. In Michael H., the issue was whether Califor-
nia's conclusive presumption in favor of the paternity of a woman's
husband at the time of conception violates the substantive or proce-
dural due process rights of a man who can prove with a 98.07%
probability that he is the biological father of the child. Writing for a
plurality, Justice Scalia rejected Michael H.'s argument, holding that
there can be no due process violation because states have historically
and traditionally enjoyed the power to prevent adulterers from en-
croaching on the legitimate family by challenging paternity.100 As we
now see, the existence of this pedigreed state power of which Califor-
nia's power to exclude Michael H. was an instance, does not prove that
there is not also a pedigreed individual right, of which Michael H.'s
right to foster a relationship with his daughter was an instance. The
rights pedigree principle is satisfied in Michael H., but Scalia does not
see this because he conflates the two principles.101
100. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 121-26.
101. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Brennan did not have to reach the sort of broad
questions of constitutional jurisprudence that plague the Court when it is called upon, as it argua-
bly was in Cruzan, to open up a new category of substantive due process rights. Rather, Michael
H. very directly follows the precedents of Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972), and Caban v.
Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979). Both cases accord substantive due process protection to the
interest of an unwed father in his relationship with his children. If a right with a pedigree had to
be named in those cases or in Michael H. (and Justice Brennan disputes the need for such a
pedigree) the historically and traditionally protected right of which this is an instance is the right
of a parent to foster a relationship with his or her child.
In Reno v. Flores, Justice Scalia's majority opinion appears more faithful to the rights pedi-
gree principle, but closer examination suggests that it is really the power pedigree principle oper-
ating again. 113 S. Ct. 1439 (1993). The plaintiffs in Reno were illegal alien children who had no
legal guardians. Specific adults in the community were willing to take responsibility for the care of
these children, but the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service, despite its conclu-
sion that these children posed no risk of flight or of harm to themselves or others, maintained a
policy that the children must remain institutionalized. Id. at 1443-45. Plaintiffs challenged this
policy on substantive due process and procedural due process grounds. Id. at 1446. The Court
upheld the policy. Id. at 1454.
At first blush, Scalia's opinion appears to entertain various candidates as rights of which the
plaintiffs' asserted rights are instances. Id. at 1447 (considering the right to be free from physical
restraint, the right to come and go at will, the right to be in the custody of one's parents or legal
1994]
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Some of Scalia's decisions concerning procedural due process also
present forceful examples of the power pedigree principle. In Pacific
Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip,10° Scalia is explicit that historical per-
missibility of punitive damage awards conclusively establishes that pu-
nitive damages awards could not violate the Due Process Clause. 103 In
guardian, and the right to be released into a non-custodial setting). Rejecting each, Scalia also
goes on to reject the idea that each child deserves a hearing on his or her best interests before she
is kept in the government institution. Id. at 1449-51. However, as in Cruzan, Michael H., and the
abortion cases, Scalia's opinion is absolutely unresponsive to his colleagues' rights-based argu-
ments. And, as in Cruzan, it is Justice O'Connor (whom Justice Souter joined) whose concurring
opinion provides the sharpest contrast to Scalia's, while still remaining overall conservative in its
jurisprudence. Justice O'Connor points out that this is not a case in which the Court is "deciding
whether the constitutional concept of 'liberty' extends to some hitherto unprotected aspect of per-
sonal well-being . . . but rather whether a governmental decision implicating a squarely protected
liberty interest comports with substantive and procedural due process." Reno, 113 S. Ct. at 1456
(citations omitted). The "squarely protected liberty interest" is "freedom from institutional con-
finement." Id. at 1454-56. Of course, freedom from institutional confinement not only has a his-
torical and traditional pedigree, it is also already recognized by substantive due process precedent.
On closer examination, Scalia rejects the argument that respondents' right to come and go at
will is implicated on the ground that "juveniles, unlike adults, are always in some form of cus-
tody." Id. at 1447. Essentially, this is an argument that the power to keep these children institu-
tionally confined is an instance of the state's power to maintain custody over children who are not
in the custody of their parents. Because the latter power is well established, and because it con-
flicts with the asserted right to be free from institutional confinement, that asserted right cannot
merit due process protection, according to Scalia. Id. at 1447-49. The key inference is that a right
to be free from certain state actions could not exist, since those actions are instances of conduct
states have traditionally enjoyed the power to engage in.
102. 111 S. Ct. 1032, 1047 (Scalia, J., concurring) (process that accords with tradition of
American courts and does not violate enumerated rights "necessarily constitutes 'due' process").
103. Haslip involved a challenge to a procedural feature of the law of Alabama; its permis-
sion of the imposition of punitive damages in civil actions. The issue framed by Scalia in concur-
rence was whether a procedure that was accepted at the time of the ratification of the Due Process
Clause could be violative of that clause.
Scalia argued in Haslip that the phrase "due process of law" was historically taken to mean
"by the law of the land." He then inferred that "due process of law" should be interpreted to
mean "by the law of the land," and argued that "by the law of the land" entails in accordance
with the settled course of judicial proceedings. This led him to the conclusion that if a procedure
had historically and traditionally been utilized by courts, then its current use could not be a viola-
tion of due process of law. The legal conclusion, as applied to the issue raised in Haslip, was that
the permissibility of punitive damage awards under the Due Process Clause was established con-
clusively by the fact that such awards were traditionally and historically permitted. In short, his-
tory established that punitive damage awards were "the law of the land" and "due process" can-
not forbid whatever is the law of the land.
Translated into the substantive due process context, Haslip's "law of the land" theory states
that whatever was the substantive law of the land at the time of the ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment could not now be properly deemed a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. And
again, that is because "due process" simply means "in accordance with the law of the land." As
applied to Cruzan, the Haslip jurisprudence might be taken to imply that because suicide prohibi-
tion was part of the law of the land when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, prohibition of
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Burnham v. Superior Court of California,104 the issue was whether
procedural due process was satisfied when a state predicated its exer-
cise of personal jurisdiction upon personal service on a physically pre-
sent defendant. While Justice Brennan engaged in the usual Interna-
tional Shoe inquiry and eventually concluded that due process had not
been violated, Scalia opined that the case was governed by one simple
fact: it is "[a]mong the most firmly established principles of personal
jurisdiction in American tradition that the courts of a State have juris-
diction over nonresidents who are physically present in the State." 105 In
short, because states have traditionally enjoyed the power to exert per-
sonal jurisdiction over those who are served when physically present,
the state's current exercise of that power must be constitutional.
Scalia's emphasis on state powers may also be found outside of the
due process context. 0  In Lee v. Weisman,10 7 for example, the Court
held that inclusion of prayers in public high school graduation ceremo-
nies violated the Establishment Clause, and Justice Scalia offered a bit-
ing dissent: "In holding that the Establishment Clause prohibits invoca-
tions and benedictions at public-school graduation ceremonies, the
Court-with nary a mention that it is doing so-lays waste a tradition
that is as old as public-school graduation ceremonies them-
refusal of lifesaving treatment could not be a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
All of the problems we have already identified with Scalia's argument form generally apply to
the "law of the land" version of his argument. First, and not trivially, suicide criminalization, as
Scalia himself concedes, was not part of the law of the land when the Fourteenth Amendment was
ratified. Scalia attempts to argue that, notwithstanding this fact, states were still understood to
enjoy the power to prohibit suicide, but there were particular procedural and equitable reasons for
removing these laws from the books. From Scalia's literalist "law of the land" perspective, this is
not enough. Second, even if one assumes that somehow the permissibility of suicide prohibitions
was part of the law of the land, the question still remains whether prohibition of refusal of life-
sustaining treatment was part of the law of the land. There is no evidence that this was the case.
Only a conceptual argument linking this with suicide would show that. However, once one is
permitted to make this argument, one should also be able to make the argument that protection
against unwanted invasions of one's body was part of the law of the land, and that this is an
instance of such an invasion. Or, more particularly, one could argue-in accordance with
O'Connor-that protection against unwanted medical invasions was part of the law of the land,
and that therefore Nancy Cruzan's treatment is a violation of due process under the "law of the
land" theory.
104. Burnham v. Superior Court of California, 495 U.S. 604 (1990).
105. Id. at 610.
106. Scalia purports to limit his use of history somewhat in Haslip, Ill S. Ct. at 1054 (in
Equal Protection cases and interpretation of certain other provisions of the Constitution, history
not dispositive), but as Smith and Weisman and numerous other decisions indicate, Scalia's histor-
icist statism goes far beyond interpretation of the Due Process Clause.
107. 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992).
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selves .. .o"0 While Justice Scalia-as a matter of thorough-
ness-contested the majority's analysis of the coercive effect of prayers
at graduation, this was not the core of his dissent. Rather, as the
above-quoted passage indicates, this is yet another example of a case
that should be trivial for the Court, according to Scalia. The state must
win because the conduct it is engaging in-the power it is exercis-
ing-is a power that it has historically and traditionally enjoyed.10 9
IV. THE OUTCOME-ORIENTATION OF SCALIA'S STATISM
I have argued above that Scalia's statism is a significant compo-
nent of his constitutional jurisprudence, but that it is not warranted by
the concerns underlying the rights pedigree principle: originalism, in-
crementalism and continuity, history and tradition as a basis for knowl-
edge, and rights reduction. Why, then, does Scalia adhere to the rights
pedigree principle? It is possible, of course, that Scalia does not, in
fact, distinguish the power pedigree principle and the rights pedigree
principle, or that he labors under the misapprehension that one of the
aforementioned justifications does apply to the power pedigree princi-
ple. However, I want to suggest a somewhat different, common sense
explanation of Scalia's position.
The critical commentary in Part III, above, was qualified by not-
ing that the goal of diminishing rights protection is served, to some
extent, by the power pedigree principle.110 In other words, insofar as
108. Id. at 2678-79.
109. Employment Division v. Smith can be understood as a consistent application of his
general statist framework. Employment Division, Dep't of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith,
110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990). The question in Smith was whether state law and conduct penalizing the
use of certain substances infringed the rights of persons who used peyote-a proscribed sub-
stance-as part of religious rituals. According to Justice O'Connor, First Amendment analysis
prior to Smith would have determined first whether the conduct asserted by the individual was
protected by the Free Exercise Clause, and second, if so, whether the state had asserted a suffi-
ciently compelling interest to justify the encroachment on that protected right. Id. at 1608-09
(O'Connor, J., concurring). Scalia turned this analysis on its head. The critical question, for
Scalia, was whether the narcotics prohibition law was a statute of general applicability that it was
within the state's power to enact. If the answer to that question was affirmative, then virtually any
exercise of that power was deemed legitimate, regardless of its effect on the individual. This is so
despite the fact that the individual interests in question were incontestably rights specifically enu-
merated under the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause. Formally, of course, Scalia's view
can be rendered consistent: he is obviously interpreting the scope of the rights under the Free
Exercise Clause to be sufficiently narrow as to make room for the state's exercise of certain pow-
ers. But the essence of the holding in Smith was startling: recognition of the legitimacy of a
general state power dictates that the scope of a clearly enumerated individual right must be inter-
preted as very narrow.
110. See supra Part Il1.
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this principle (and its supplements) are understood as outcome-ori-
ented, as devices for skewing the outcome against rights, employment
of the power pedigree principle is coherent. That principle is, of course,
more powerful in reducing rights recognition than the rights pedigree
principle would be if used alone."'
I do, not mean to suggest that Scalia's statism is only comprehensi-
ble as a political tool, in the sense of being a rule designed to give
states victories on certain political issues. Scalia may or may not be
political in this sense; I do not purport to judge that issue. Scalia's
jurisprudence is outcome-oriented in a subtler but broader sense. The
goal of skewing the outcome against rights, according to Scalia himself,
is to take fewer questions off of the legislative agenda, with the ulti-
mate goal of providing more power to democratically elected officials
(legislators and executives) and less power to moralizing, unaccounta-
ble judges, whose exercises of discretion are, on Scalia's view, inconsis-
tent with an appropriate conception of the rule of law as a law of rules.
Thus, for example, in Cruzan, Scalia's doctrinal arguments are in-
troduced and concluded with forceful prose deriding the Court's will-
ingness to engage in any analysis in the right-to-die area:
While I agree with the Court's analysis today, and therefore join its opinion,
I would have preferred that we announce, clearly and promptly, that the federal
courts have no business in this field; that [power pedigree argument] . . ., that
the point at which life becomes "worthless," and the point at which the means
necessary to preserve it become "extraordinary" or "inappropriate," are neither
set forth in the Constitution nor known to the nine Justices of this Court any
better than they are known to nine people picked at random from the Kansas
City telephone directory; and hence, that even when it is demonstrated by clear
and convincing evidence that a patient no longer wishes certain measures to be
taken to preserve his or her life, it is up to the citizens of Missouri to decide,
through their elected representatives, whether that wish will be honored. 12
This is a bold assertion that the Constitution should not be interpreted
as having any implications for individual rights protection in right-to-
die issues. We have seen, however, that Scalia's doctrinal argument it-
self fails, unless he has some ground that I have not adequately can-
vassed for the power pedigree principle. Thus, Scalia's statism appears
to rely on his own prior judgment of political theory that it is intolera-
111. None of Scalia's opinions suggest that he would reject a pro-state decision based solely
on the rights pedigree principle; the power pedigree principle is used as a limitation supplement-
ing, not a replacement of, the rights pedigree principle.
112. 497 U.S. at 293.
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ble to permit federal courts to enter this area of decision-making. In-
deed, this is just what Scalia reveals in concluding his opinion:
This Court need not, and has no authority to, inject itself into every field of
human activity where irrationality and oppression may theoretically occur, and if
it tries to do so it will destroy itself.'13
The analysis above thus suggests that the ultimate justification for
the power pedigree principle is a strong commitment to rights reduc-
tion, founded on a view of the limited competence of the judiciary. Be-
cause rights are more effectively reduced by the power pedigree princi-
ple, that is the principle Scalia has chosen. This points to what is
perhaps the deepest difference between the rights pedigree principle
and the power pedigree principle. The rights pedigree principle is used
by the conservatives on the assumption that some effort must be made
to interpret the Constitution, and that history and tradition ought to
play a guiding role in that interpretation. Scalia, by contrast, takes
himself to know merely by virtue of a priori political reasoning which
issues should be on the legislative agenda and which should not, what is
within the judiciary's competence and what is not. In the Cruzan case
(as in most) he claims to know that the issue in question (the prohib-
itability of removing life-sustaining treatment) should be permitted to
stay on the legislative agenda. 114 The power pedigree principle appar-
ently serves as a post hoc device for accomplishing this task.
In one sense, this analysis is hardly surprising, for Scalia has been
explicit about his blanket opposition to substantive due process and
unenumerated rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.1 1 5 However, as
a Justice of the Supreme Court at this point in time, blanket opposition
to unenumerated rights is contrary to precedent. By openly purporting
to adopt the rights pedigree principle, rather than simply writing a pure
condemnation of substantive due process, Justice Scalia is apparently
manifesting a recognition of his obligation to respect that precedent.
The power pedigree principle, masquerading as the rights pedigree
principle, permits Scalia to maintain the appearance of respect for pre-
cedent while simultaneously minimizing substantive due process rights.
What is surprising about Scalia's position-if the analysis of this
section is correct-is that text, precedent, and history do not play an
113. Id. at 300-01.
114. Id.
115. See Haslip, supra note 102; TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 113 S. Ct.
2711, 2726-27 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring).
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intrinsic role in Scalia's "power pedigree" jurisprudence of the Due
Process Clause. They enter only after the fact as a rationale for a deci-
sion made independently on grounds of political theory.'16 This is ironic
in light of Scalia's own insistence on the importance of text and history
in constitutional adjudication.
Perhaps Scalia's enthusiasm for stare decisis is tepid,1 7 and per-
haps he is ultimately concerned with a construction of the Constitution
that embodies a defensible conception of the judicial role, and mini-
mizes the judicial opportunity to exercise discretion.1 8 The primary
emphasis of this article has been to contrast Scalia's statist traditional-
ism with what I have called the "conservative" due process framework,
and to argue that the rationales underlying the conservative framework
do not justify adherence to Scalia's statism. I have not attempted to
argue against Scalia's entire conception of the Constitution and the
proper role of the judiciary-an adequate portrayal of Scalia's jurispru-
dence and a full response to those views would exceed the scope of this
article."19 I shall conclude, however, by suggesting a further contrast
116. Of course, Scalia would argue that the critical fact in his interpretation of the Consti-
tution is the absence of text addressing the right to refuse life-sustaining treatment or medical
treatment generally; in this sense, it is textually based. However, as Scalia recognizes regretfully,
see supra text accompanying notes 43-47, the Court's doctrine does not admit an argument based
on the premise that only enumerated rights are protected. Moreover, insofar as his argument is
based on the originalism suggested in Haslip, it does not speak to the proper resolution of cases
where history and tradition provide both a right and a tradition, see supra text accompanying
notes 73-74, and supra note 102, and therefore cannot carry the weight of his argument.
117. See, e.g., Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2873 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (Roe should be overruled;
suggesting Justice need not respect stare decisis where he or she believes precedent was badly
wrong).
118. See Scalia, supra note 50; Scalia, supra note 55; Sullivan, supra note 15.
119. In particular, it is worth examining the possibility that Scalia views the Bill of Rights
as, in the first instance, an articulation of certain kinds of state conduct that are, for reasons that
can be stated without reliance on a notion of individual liberties, outside of the state's proper
power, and not as an articulation of spheres of precious individual liberties. This article is not
intended to rule out the possibility that there are some contexts in which Scalia's general focus on
state powers (as opposed to his particular endorsement of the power pedigree principle) might, in
fact, explain some of Scalia's decisions against states. For example, in R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 112 S.
Ct. 2538 (1992), Scalia does not find the unprotectedness of the individual's speech to dispose of
the First Amendment claim; the crucial point is that because the state has engaged in the wrong-
ful conduct at which the First Amendment is aimed--discrimination on the basis of view-
point-the state conduct violates the First Amendment. In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Coun-
cil, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992), Scalia, concludes that South Carolina's regulation on use of property,
which deprived petitioner of the value of his land, was a "taking" unless the State's regulation is
aimed only at uses of land that the State would have had the power to prohibit through the
common law of nuisance and property.
Of course, these comments are only meant to be suggestive; Scalia's treatment of speech and
property obviously merit in-depth analysis.
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between Scalia's framework and that of his conservative colleagues,
and a more general reason for questioning the tenability of Scalia's
framework at a broader level.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS: SCALIA'S STATISM AND THE NOTION OF
A LIVING CONSTITUTION
Cruzan is a dramatic illustration of a prevalent kind of constitu-
tional case. Changes in society, knowledge, and technology have cre-
ated areas of human behavior in which states wish to regulate, and
some individuals wish to remain free from regulation. The Constitution,
the precedents, and our history of practices do not speak directly to the
issue. History includes an individual right, which individuals are able to
argue should extend to this new issue. But history also includes a state
power, which states are able to argue should extend to this new issue.
Because of these changes, we have an issue which lies in the gray area
of the right and the power.
Traditional Fourteenth Amendment analysis would proceed as fol-
lows: the individual would need to show that there is a protected inter-
est in this new kind of case. This can be done by showing that it is an
instance of an enumerated right, or otherwise, that it is an instance of a
right that is historically and traditionally protected, or that it is essen-
tial to the concept of ordered liberty. If this is indeed shown, then the
question becomes whether the state can articulate a sufficiently compel-
ling interest to justify this deprivation, or (subsequent to Casey)
whether the state has placed an undue burden on that right. 120 Scru-
tiny, once the right has been identified, is a core exercise of the power
of judicial review.
In recent years, the more conservative members on the Supreme
Court-Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice White, Justice O'Connor, Jus-
tice Kennedy, Justice Souter, Justice Thomas, and frequently Justice
Scalia himself-have advocated greater restraint in the articulation of
unenumerated rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. This advocacy
has altered the framework in principally two forms, corresponding to
the two parts of substantive due process analysis. First, they have be-
gun to require a historical pedigree for any unenumerated right to gain
120. In Casey, the joint opinion rejected a strict scrutiny--compelling government interest
test for an undue burden test in the context of abortion. See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2819. The extext
to which the undue burden analysis applies to rights other than abortion is unclear. See, e.g.,
Compassion in Dying, supra note 65 (applying undue burden analysis in right to physician as-
sisted suicide case).
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"protected interest" status.121 This is what has been called the "rights
pedigree principle." And second, they have increased their openness to
state claims about the identification and weighting of legitimate inter-
ests, holding that historical judgment is a significant factor in this
analysis.
The influence of these aspects of the Court's developing jurispru-
dence is amply illustrated in the various opinions in Cruzan. Justice
Stevens' opinion might be thought a fine example of Fourteenth
Amendment analysis from its heyday, delving into the profound ethical
questions surrounding our conception of death, articulating the value of
liberty from the state in that arena, and expressing deep suspicion of
the state's thinly veiled attempts to impose its religiously motivated
moralism on individuals where it counts most.122 To the extent that his
opinion depends on those types of arguments-and that is unclear-it
is vulnerable to criticism from the conservative due process framework.
However, Stevens's dissenting opinion was unjoined-he was one
among nine-and none of the other opinions in this case accept the
unrevised due process framework. Justice Brennan, Justice O'Connor,
and Chief Justice Rehnquist each begins the analysis by showing both
precedent and a historical pedigree for the right in question. Each con-
siders the state to have a legitimate interest in preserving life. And
each appears to believe that the existence of a right to refuse life-sus-
taining treatment depends on whether that interest is sufficient to out-
weigh the individual's right.
Yet Justice Scalia's opinion conflicts with the position reached by
both O'Connor and Brennan, and explicitly left as an open possibility
by Rehnquist. As should be evident by now, this is because Scalia is
not using the familiar conservative due process framework. He has
added to that framework state-power enhancing principles: as we have
seen, the power pedigree principle, and the balance-of-interest pedigree
principle. On this view, the Court's task is not to articulate constitu-
tional rights and powers in a way that pays high regard to history,
disdains novel evaluation of interests, and takes seriously the state's
conception of legitimate interest. That was the conservative framework.
Now the Court's task is to ensure that the state may assert any exten-
sion of powers once enjoyed.
The conservative framework provides a narrow principle of growth
121. But see Casey, supra note 15 (joint opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, J.J.).
122. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 330-57.
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in the Constitution, for the increasing sorts of behaviors that are possi-
ble and regulations that states may attempt. If it appears that a new
kind of regulation on a new kind of behavior is indeed an infringement
of a protected interest, the question is whether the Constitution should
be interpreted to permit that kind of infringement. The Court cannot
make that judgment without considering the state's interest, and an
intelligent consideration will pay respect to history. All in all, it will
attempt to allow both rights and powers to grow in a way that is conso-
nant with the constitutional vision.
Note that this is a different kind of constitutional growth than is
often referred to by moderate conservatives such as Justice Harlan 123
or liberals such as Justice Brennan. It need not involve any change in
values. And it need not involve any new sort of self-awareness or self-
understanding. It need not involve any recognition that what we once
thought was a right is not really a right. Nor need it involve any con-
flict with original intent. It is consistent with (although not necessarily
guided by) the set of individual rights and state powers as originally
understood. This conservative conception of constitutional growth was
well put by Judge Robert Bork, in the concurring opinion in Ollman v.
Evans,124 where he sharply disagreed with then-Judge Scalia's unwill-
ingness to permit for any form of evolution in individual rights:
125
There would be little need for judges-and certainly no office for a philosophy of
judging-if the boundaries of every constitutional provision were self-evident.
They are not. In a case like this, it is the task of the judge in this generation to
discern how the framers' values, defined in the context of the world they knew,
apply to the world we know. The world changes in which unchanging values find
their application.
128
These words capture a rather narrow version of "the notion of a living
constitution"-the sense endorsed by then-Justice Rehnquist in an ad-
123. See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 551 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
124. 750 F.2d 970, 993 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc) (Bork, J., concurring, with Ginsburg,
MacKinnon, and Wilkey, JJ., joining the concurrence), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127 (1985).
125. Id. at 1036, 1038 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("It seems to me that the identification of
'modern problems' to be remedied is quintessentially legislative rather than judicial business
. .. 1').
126. Id. at 995. Of course, Judge Bork's view of substantive due process and unenumerated
rights is extremely narrow, and the broader quoted passage from which the quotation in the text is
excerpted reveals that narrowness. However, the point is not that Bork would have disagreed with
Scalia in Cruzan-this article does not comment on that issue-but that, as a general matter of
constitutional jurisprudence, Scalia's statism is inconsistent with even a highly conservative notion
of constitutional growth such as Bork's.
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dress by that name, where he observed that the framers "left to suc-
ceeding generations the task of applying [general] language to the in-
creasingly changing environment in which they would live. 127 It is not
surprising that in Cruzan this restrained view of the Constitution was
endorsed by Justice O'Connor and the Chief Justice himself.
Scalia's Cruzan opinion is an attempt to reject even this narrow
conception of a living Constitution. In its place, he offers the power
pedigree principle. This says that as long as the state has any power
which it can argue extends to this case, the state should be permitted to
extend it. On this view, the set of constitutionally protected kinds of
behavior remains the same, as the set of possible behaviors increases,
and the set of possible regulations of behaviors also increases. The set
of recognized state powers may grow and grow, but recognized individ-
ual rights must remain precisely where they are. This remains true
even if the growth of powers and the stillness of rights flies in the face
of our historic values.
127. William H. Rehnquist, Observation: The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEx. L
REv. 693, 694 (1976).
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